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 Russian politics, policy-making
 and American missile defence
 MIKHAIL TSYPKIN*
 American policy-makers continue to struggle with Russia's intensely negative
 reaction to the proposed ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployments in Central
 Europe. As Russian president, Vladimir Putin denounced the plans for missile
 defence put forward by US president George W. Bush. Putin's successor, Dmitry
 Medvedev, greeted the election of Barack Obama by threatening to target the
 proposed BMD facility in Poland with new missiles. All American assurances
 that the proposed deployment is a limited one, designed for defence against Iran,
 appear to have been wasted on the Russians. They argue that the presence of
 American missile defence in Europe would result in a relationship of strategic
 instability between the two largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia.
 Strategic instability occurs when one nuclear power can threaten another nuclear
 power with an attack with nuclear weapons in the knowledge that the victim of
 the attack would be unable to retaliate. The weaker party has the option of either
 pre-empting attack with a first nuclear strike or accepting, under compulsion,
 the demands of the stronger party. Western analyses of Russian behaviour have
 focused on possible threats to the Russian strategic deterrent and Russia's interests
 in Central Europe.1 Even those highly critical of the proposed limited missile
 defence deployment do not see it as an immediate threat to the Russian strategic
 deterrent. Why, then, has the reaction from Moscow been so vehement? This
 article will address the domestic political context and policy-making patterns
 that have shaped the response by the Putin and Medvedev administrations to the
 proposed American missile defence deployments in Central Europe.2
 * The author is grateful to Jerome Conley and David S. Yost for their comments on this article which represents
 solely the views of the author.
 1 See e.g. Stephen J. Cimbala, 'Going ballistic over missile defenses: what matters and why'', Journal of Slavic
 Military Studies 20: 4, 2007, pp. 449?73 ; George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, 'European missile defense:
 the technological basis of Russian concerns', Arms Control Today, Oct. 2007, http ://www.armscontrol.org/
 act/2007_io/LewisPostol.asp, accessed 2 Aug. 2008; Walter B. Slocombe, 'Europe, Russia and American
 missile defence', Survival 50: 2, April?May 2008, pp. 19?24.
 2 I will discuss primarily the Putin administration because the decision to confront the US over missile defence
 was made by President Putin, because the political regime he created is still very much in place, and also
 because he evidently continues to be the power behind the throne in the Kremlin.
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 Domestic politics as a 'special operation7
 In order to understand Russia's reaction to the American plans to deploy limited
 missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic, one must consider the political
 theatre directed by the Kremlin in 2007?2008 in anticipation of the succession to
 President Putin. The Russian political system rests uneasily on powerful financial
 industrial clans, whose relations can be best described by Winston Churchill's refer
 ence to a bulldog fight under a rug. The president's job is to manage this competition
 lest it get out of control and the country, lacking much of the apparatus of a genuine
 democracy?real political parties, a strong parliament, thriving civil society and
 responsible media?descend into semi-chaos, which might swallow him and his
 court. This is a complicated job: to keep the system operating smoothly, lucrative
 government appointments need to be apportioned among various clans, and public
 opinion needs to be manipulated to avoid surprises during elections.
 An astute observer of the Russian political scene has described the nature of the
 political process in Putin's Russia as a 'special operation': a term from the Soviet
 intelligence vocabulary, describing covert activities pursued in order to achieve
 political results. The secretiveness of special operation politics is due to the wide
 gap between the fa?ade of managed democracy and the fact that real power is vested
 in the top leader, the president, and his immediate entourage. The fa?ade, with its
 elections, political parties, mass media and NGOs, must be maintained without
 the violence practised by twentieth-century totalitarian regimes, and at the same
 time without putting into the slightest doubt the outcome of the elections.3 This
 is a daunting task in a multi-ethnic nation of nearly 140 million people spread over
 nearly one-sixth of the Earth's landmass from Europe to the Far East and from the
 Arctic to the border with China.
 The popularity of Putin and of his successor Medvedev has to be maintained
 through media manipulation and publicity campaigns. The media, especially televi
 sion, while generally under the control of the Kremlin, can in fact be influenced
 by competing factions among the Putinist elite. Any real or imagined problem can
 be spun by Russia's 'political technologists' (the Russian term for spin doctors) to
 smear and weaken any political figure. One of the top priorities in planning and
 executing a 'special operation' is to exclude the possibility of anything disrupting
 the smooth conduct of the planned media campaign. The need to ensure precision
 and maintain control in 'special operations' makes the Kremlin prone to panic in
 the face of even small-scale street protests and public criticism.
 The publicity package, successfully used by the Kremlin since Putin's rise to
 power in 2000, has several components:
 Putin is a true father of the nation.
 At home, he has reined in the corrupt oligarchs, and is using Russia's newly
 found wealth to improve standards of living.
 Abroad, he has reasserted Russia as a great power ; unlike Gorbachev and Yeltsin,
 Putin will not allow Russia to be pushed around.
 3 Dmitriy Furman, 'Politika ushla v podpol'ye', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 June 2007.
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 Foreign policy components of this package are clearly important. Opinion polls
 show that the image of Russia's restoration as a great power gave Putin nearly as
 much popularity as economic growth. According to the widely respected indepen
 dent Levada Center, 32 per cent of Russians, polled after Putin's February 2007
 speech in Munich in which he harshly attacked the US, viewed his foreign policy
 as the main success of his tenure, equal to the percentage who viewed economic
 growth as Putin's main achievement; the number of those who saw Putin's assertive
 foreign policy as his main achievement actually increased between 2004 and 2007.4
 On a more personal level, Putin has cultivated his image as a strong man, which
 is critically important for his role in Russian domestic politics. Putin started his
 political career with a promise to 'rub out terrorists in the outhouse', crushed the
 Chechen rebels, and successfully took on and destroyed Russia's richest oligarch
 Mikhail Khodorkovskiy. Being perceived as tough is very important in the role of
 arbiter of clan interests : Putin has to deal with what Ivan Krastev has described
 as 'the new Russian elite', 'made up of the winners of the zero-sum game of the
 transition [from communism to the free market system]. They are highly self
 confident, risk prone and immensely wealthy.'5 Looking weak in their eyes would
 be political suicide. This was especially so during the run-up to the presidential
 succession, when Putin had to ensure that no one took him for a lame duck. Putin
 needs his 'tough' image no less now, when he has relinquished his formal powers as
 the head of state, but has preserved for the time being his real powers as the arbiter
 and enforcer of clan discipline.
 What does it all have to do with missile defence?
 Nuclear paranoia
 The Russian political and media space has been populated, since the early 1990s,
 by fears that Russia may somehow lose its nuclear weapons. Such concerns have
 ranged from superficially rational worst-case scenarios of an American first strike
 all the way to conspiracy theories. For instance, Putin was accused (by unnamed
 leakers) of entering into a secret agreement with the US to turn over the command
 and control of Russian strategic nuclear forces to the Pentagon. This charge,
 ludicrous as it was, circulated in the Russian mass media at the time the US and
 Russia signed the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative in February 2005.6 It was
 viewed with enough concern by the Kremlin to merit an official rebuttal by the
 then chief of the general staff, army general Yuriy Baluyevskiy, by the Ministry
 of Foreign Affairs, and by Andrei Kokoshin, a member of parliament and a noted
 expert on strategic systems.7
 4 A. Golov, 'Otsenki deystviy V. V. Putina za gody yego prezidentskogo pravleniya', 17 April 2007, Levada
 Center, http://www.levada.ru/press/2007041701.html, accessed 26 April 2007.
 5 Ivan Krastev, 'Russia as the "other Europe'", Russia in Global Affairs 5: 4, Oct.?Dec. 2007, p. 78.
 See e.g. Igor Dmitriev, 'Za steklom', Versiya, 7 Feb. 2005, http://www.versiasovsek.ru/material.phpP2710,
 accessed 28 Aug. 2008; 'Moscow rally calls to prevent US control over Russian nuclear facilities', Interfax, 20
 Feb. 2005; Aleksandr Gol'ts, 'Bratislavskoye obostreniye', Yezhednevnyy zhurnal, 21 Feb. 2005, http://www.
 ej.ru/comments/entry/272/, accessed 21 Feb. 2005.
 7 'Russian armed forces chief of staff concerned about low-yield nuclear weapons development', Agentstvo
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 Events that Americans would consider to be totally insignificant have been
 known to provoke Russian nuclear angst. The publication in 2006 of an article
 by two young American academics suggesting that current trends in the develop
 ment of US and Russian nuclear forces might enable the US to carry out a first
 strike against Russia with impunity provoked a storm of concern in Moscow.
 While there were a few steady reassurances by Russian experts, the predominant
 response was nervous at best, panicky at worst.9 The article reportedly became the
 subject of a serious discussion between the military high command and the civilian
 leadership, which demanded reassurances.10 Putin is evidently inclined to exploit
 such fears for political ends, and perhaps is not immune to nuclear conspirato
 rial thinking himself. In the aftermath of the Beslan school massacre by Chechen
 terrorists in September 2004, the badly shaken Putin lashed out at those who, he
 alleged, wanted to dismember Russia with the help from some unnamed sources
 (presumably, the US) because it is a nuclear superpower.11 Either he was trying to
 deflect public anger by pointing to a foreign conspiracy of this kind or?perhaps?
 he believed in this conspiracy himself.I2
 While serious public discussion of strategic issues is limited in Russia, nuclear
 weapons have made for an excellent political theatre in Moscow. President Boris
 Yeltsin often used his role as the commander-in-chief of a nuclear superpower
 as a publicity instrument to compensate for the image of Russia's?and his
 own?weakness: his participation in exercises launching strategic missiles from
 submarines, his role in handling the nuclear 'briefcase' (a device containing codes
 for releasing nuclear weapons) were given wide publicity. Vladimir Putin was
 much more convincing in the role of the nuclear superpower's commander-in
 chief, spending a night on board a missile-carrying submarine and taking part
 in a training flight of a Blackjack strategic bomber, complete with a launch of a
 voyennykh novostey, i March 2005 ; 'Kommentariy departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s
 voprosom SMI otnositel'no soobshcheniy o yakoby planiruemom podpisanii dogovora o kontrole nad obyek
 tami rossiyskogo yaderno-oruzheinogo kompleksa, 276?11?02?2005', http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/
 B68110D9641DCE4FC3256FA5004E538B, accessed 11 Feb. 2005; 'Kokoshin: SShA ne budut kontrolirovat'
 yadernye obyekty Rossii', RIA Novosti, http://www.utro.ru/news/2005/02/28/412599.shtml, accessed 2
 March 2005.
 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, 'The rise of U.S. nuclear primacy', Foreign Affairs 85: 2, March?April 2006,
 pp. 42-54
 9 Dmitriy Litovkin, 'Illyuzii prevoskhodstva', Izvestiya, 27 March 2006, http://www.izvestia.ru/armia2/arti
 cle309i47i/index.html, accessed 28 March 2006; Sergei Brezkun, 'Pervyy preventivnyy udar po yadernoy
 moshchi Rossii uzhe nanesen', http://www.oborona.ru/comment/?id=200i2o8, accessed 20 May 2007; Nikita
 Petrov, 'Yadernyy pasyans', http://www.strana.ru/text/stories/01/11/05/1951/277818.html, 31 March 2006,
 accessed 4 May 2006; 'Russian nuclear weapons expert responds to Foreign Affairs article', Interfax-AVN, 22
 March 2006.
 10 Alexander G. Savelyev, Russian defense and arms control policy and its prospects after the presidential elections, UNISCI
 Discussion Paper 17, May 2008, p. 103.
 11 'Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina', 4 Sept. 2004, http://www.kremlin.ru/text/
 appears/2004/09/76320.shtml, accessed 19 Aug. 2006.
 12 This is how one of the most authoritative and perceptive Russian analysts describes Putin's mindset: 'His
 familiarity with the functioning of the underside of foreign relations and economic contacts has resulted in
 his belief that the "underside" of politics and economics is the only true story to tell. In other words, what
 is publicly available is usually a deceptive cover, camouflage; the "real thing" only comes in a folder marked
 "top secret". That has developed into something which might be called "night vision" as opposed to the "day
 vision" of "conventional" people' : Dmitri Trenin, 'Russia's foreign and security policy under Putin', Moscow
 Carnegie Center, http ://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/728o4.htm, accessed 28 May 2007.
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 nuclear-capable cruise missile. Apparently, this political theatre is popular among
 the Russian public. The Russian Orthodox Church, a de facto official Church with
 an astute political sense, has lavished attention upon the strategic nuclear forces
 by blessing command posts and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.13 The show of
 nuclear and conventional power is directed at the Russian public as part of an effort
 to strengthen the new Medvedev?Putin duumvirate and to reassure the public
 about the state of the military.
 Extreme suspicion of the US on the part of the Russian elite (discussed below)
 is particularly pronounced in respect of strategic arms control. Unfortunately,
 many Russian political figures are ignorant of the basics of strategic weapons and
 arms control. In a recent interview, Sergei Mironov, the speaker of the upper
 house of the Russian parliament, described the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
 (START I), signed in 1991, as a 'betrayal' of Russia's national interests. Minister
 of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov reportedly voiced a similar opinion in a conver
 sation with journalists and said that the presence of American inspectors at the
 missile factory in Votkinsk in accordance with START I allows the US to steal
 Russian technological secrets.14 And these opinions are being voiced at a time
 when President Medvedev has proclaimed the renewal of START I to be one of
 Russia's top national security priorities. Since neither Serdyukov nor Mironov can
 be suspected of opposing the Kremlin, their pronouncements are an example of
 how uninformed many Russian public figures are about strategic issues. Rather
 than learn more, they tend to treat arms control agreements as an American plot
 against Russia.
 Given the Russians' extreme sensitivity concerning their nuclear forces, and the
 tendency to use this subject as material for political theatre, the issue of American
 missile defence deployments in the former Soviet satellites, if left without a proper
 spin by the Kremlin, could introduce an unpredictable and therefore highly unwel
 come element into the tense, complicated and turbulent politics of Putin's succes
 sion and post-succession. A 'political technologist' could easily concoct a devilish
 PR brew, mixing in Putin's reluctance to make a big issue of the US withdrawal
 from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, and the US deployment of a
 system purportedly meant to make Russia helpless in the face of an American first
 strike. Indeed, a weekly owned by Russia's major arms manufacturer, Almaz-Antei
 Inc., attributed the American decision to deploy missile defence bases in Central
 Europe to the lack of a forceful Russian response to the American withdrawal from
 the ABM Treaty.15 Any such response, of course, would have been in the hands of
 President Putin. It is noteworthy that at the time of the publication the chairman
 of the board of directors of Almaz-Antei was also one of the most powerful leaders
 13 Stanislav Minin, 'S yadernym shchitom i pravoslavnoy khorugv'yu', Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 5 Aug.
 2007.
 14 Vladimir Dvorkin, 'Tretiy protiv pervogo', Yezhednevnyy zhurnal, 7 May 2009, http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=9056,
 accessed 26 May 2009.
 15 Yuriy Avdeyevskiy, 'Vashington ignoriruyet interesy bezopasnosti Rossii', Voyenno-promyshlennyy kury'er, 26
 Dec. 2006?8 Jan. 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/print.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.216.articles.weapon_02,
 accessed 30 Dec. 2007.
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 of the financial?industrial clans, deputy head of the presidential administration
 in charge of personnel, ex-KGB officer Victor Ivanov. Putin's alleged negligence
 in his stewardship of nuclear weapons also came under attack from pro-western
 liberals. 'Summing up Putin', a 'report by independent experts' signed by such
 fixtures of democratic opposition as the ex-deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov
 and ex-deputy minister of energy Vladimir Milov, accused Putin of doing nothing
 to stop the natural attrition of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, and points out:
 'Under such conditions, the mission of deterrence by strategic nuclear forces is in
 doubt : it will become possible to destroy practically all Russian nuclear forces by
 a disarming non-nuclear precision-guided strike, while the few [Russian] missiles
 that will be launched will be finished off by strategic missile defense.'1 It is not
 surprising that Putin preferred to exploit the issue of missile defence himself rather
 than let others use it against him.
 Putin's handling of the missile defence issue also could have damaged his image
 as a strong man. As noted above, when the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty in
 2002, Russia disapproved, but Putin's protest was muted.17 On 24 May that year,
 during President Bush's visit to Moscow, the two leaders signed a joint declaration
 which, among other things, pledged to implement
 a number of steps aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the
 area of missile defence, including the exchange of information on missile defence programs
 and tests in this area, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation
 aimed at familiarization with missile defense systems ... The United States and Russia also
 agreed to study possible areas for missile defense cooperation, including the expansion of
 joint exercises related to missile defense, and the exploration of potential programs for the
 joint research and development of missile defense technologies.
 Further, the declaration pledges 'substantive consultation across a broad range of
 international security issues'.1
 The joint declaration apparently left Putin with the impression that the US
 would take Russian views into consideration when proceeding with its missile
 defence plans. Washington, however, saw nothing in the joint declaration obliging
 it to ask for the Russians' opinions on the subject.19 There is no indication that the
 two nations engaged in consultations on missile defence until Secretary of Defense
 Robert Gates arrived in Moscow on 23 April 2007 to meet Vladimir Putin and his
 national security team. Until then, the US had briefed the Russians on the plans to
 deploy missile defences in Central Europe, but it appears that nothing approaching
 consultation had taken place. A knowledgeable Russian observer commented in
 2007:
 Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, Nezavisimyy ekspertnyy doklad 'Putin. Itogi (Moscow: Novaya gazeta,
 2008), p. 19.
 17 See Savelyev, Russian defense and arms control policy, p. 101.
 1 Text of Joint Declaration, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, 24 May 2002, http : //www. white
 house. gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524?2.html, accessed 22 May 2008.
 19 According to a recent report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld successfully resisted the implementation
 of the Joint Declaration: see Robert Draper, 'And he shall be judged', GQ, 17 May 2009, http://men.style.
 com/gq/features/full?id=content_92i7&pageNum=4, accessed 17 May 2009.
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 One of the reasons for Moscow's sharp reaction to Washington's missile defence plans is
 the arrogance with which the incumbent White House administration makes unilateral
 decisions on strategic issues. And although U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
 asserted that Moscow had been informed about U.S. plans to deploy missile defence bases
 in Poland and the Czech Republic on a dozen occasions, apparently this is not the type of
 format for relations that suits Russia.20
 The different readings of the joint declaration were compounded by a general
 breakdown in high-level communications and cultural asymmetries in policy
 making in both nations. Thomas Graham, the former senior director for Russia at
 the National Security Council in George W. Bush's administration, has noted that
 'reliable channels of communication' between the White House and the Kremlin
 broke down, especially during Bush's second term: 'The Consultative Group for
 Strategic Security (the original "2+2" of foreign and defence ministers), and the
 working groups under it, was moribund from the moment it was created by the
 Joint Declaration of May 2002.'2I Missile defence fell victim to this lack of commu
 nications: it appears that briefings on missile defence were presented by American
 officials no higher than deputy assistant secretary rank. In the US, these officials
 are quite senior and have considerable influence on policy-making. In Russia,
 their equivalents have little influence on policy, which is made by the president
 and his few immediate associates. Sending a message on such a sensitive political
 issue as missile defence via what the Russians perceive to be lowly underlings was
 certainly seen as a deliberate snub to President Putin, as well as part of a policy of
 ignoring Russia that the Kremlin has found so frustrating. This made Putin look
 both outsmarted by the Americans and weak, something he could ill afford.
 Domestic popularity of 'great power7 status
 Russia's foreign policy has often been described as revisionist : Russia is trying to
 free itself of constraints imposed during the period of its exceptional weakness.22
 The linkage between this basis for foreign policy and domestic politics is quite
 clear, for the idea of turning Russia into a great power again is widely popular.
 Western observers often make the mistake of attributing the pursuit of great
 power status and the anti-western sentiments accompanying it primarily to Putin
 and his undemocratic tendencies. In fact, soon after the collapse of the USSR in
 1991 a consensus emerged across the range of Russian elites that (1) Gorbachev's
 'new thinking', which discounted the use of different types of power in interna
 tional relations, had failed, and (2) Russia's natural role in the international system
 is that of a major power.23 As early as 1992 Vladimir Lukin, a liberal political
 20 Vladimir Dvorkin, 'Threats posed by the U.S. missile shield', Russia in Global Affairs 5: 2, April?June 2007,
 21 P' 3I'
 Thomas Graham, U.S.?Russia relations : facing reality pragmatically (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and
 International Studies, 2008), pp. 4, 5.
 Dmitri Trenin, Russia's strategic choices, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, policy brief 50, May
 2007, pp. 1, 2.
 23 This development is discussed in Mikhail Tsypkin, 'Military power in Russian national security policy', in
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 figure and democratic Russia's first ambassador to the US, warned against 'infan
 tile' pro-Americanism in Russian foreign policy and advocated Russia's develop
 ment as a democratic 'great power'.24 Seventeen years of post-Soviet development
 have demonstrated that the idea of Russia as a great power capable of asserting
 and defending its interests is deeply entrenched in Russian political culture.
 Throughout the 1990s Russian politicians unanimously denounced the idea of a
 unipolar world under even a benevolent US hegemony. And in 1999, enraged and
 humiliated by Russia's inability to prevent the NATO attack on Yugoslavia, Presi
 dent Boris Yeltsin authorized a reckless attempt by Russian paratroopers to create
 a Russian sector in Kosovo, in order to demonstrate that Russia's opinions had to
 be taken into account. The attempt, despite its failure and the danger of military
 confrontation with NATO, was universally popular in Russia at a time when the
 government exercised little control over the media. The enlargement of NATO
 has certainly collided with the Russian sense of great power identity, and the plans
 for American missile defence next door have only sharpened the contradiction
 between Russian ambitions and reality.
 Intelligence analysis and threat assessment
 The character of intelligence analysis, threat assessment and decision-making
 by politicians obviously has an impact on the Kremlin's behaviour in relation to
 American plans for missile defence in Central Europe. Top decision-makers receive
 information on foreign military affairs primarily from the intelligence services, the
 External Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the
 General Staff (GRU), which is tasked with the collection and analysis of informa
 tion on all matters military. The inside history of arms control negotiations through
 the Soviet era strongly suggests that the Soviet military tended to exaggerate the
 western threat, sometimes wildly, while the diplomats offered the politicians more
 realistic assessments of western capabilities. Without arms control negotiations?
 without the Standing Consultative Commission, which disappeared together with
 the ABM Treaty25?the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the interpre
 tation of US missile defence developments has probably become weaker while
 the role of the military has grown. With the diplomats out of the equation, the
 military have been likely to construct a worst-case scenario out of the American
 missile defence plans.
 Military intelligence, part and parcel of a strictly hierarchical organization,
 is not likely to challenge the prevailing military orthodoxy. The Russian high
 command has demonstrated a clear preference for treating the US as the main
 threat, and it is more than likely that a GRU analysis of American missile defence
 plans has done nothing to challenge this notion. The history of the GRU suggests
 Sanford R. Lieberman, ed., The Soviet empire reconsidered: essays in honor of Adam B. Ulam (Boulder, CO: West
 view, 1994), pp. 192?6, 203, 204.
 24 Vladimir Lukin, 'Rossiya i yego interesy', Nezavisimayagazeta, 20 Oct. 1992.
 25 The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the ABM Treaty, served as the forum for discussing
 issues relating to the treaty.
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 that the domination of military intelligence by the general staff results in threat
 assessments sharply skewed to support the military's agenda.2 The Russian intelli
 gence system lacks a review mechanism such as that provided by the National Intel
 ligence Council in the US, and therefore the findings of the GRU and SVR are
 most probably sent directly to the top political leadership dominated by Vladimir
 Putin. The military do not drive Russia's security policy?as demonstrated by
 the ruthless manner in which Anatoly Serdyukov, appointed by Putin as defence
 minister, is overhauling the defence establishment?but they are good at guessing
 how the political winds are blowing and providing information that fans the fears
 of their civilian leaders.
 Putin as intelligence analyst-in-chief
 Putin appeared to control national security policy single-handed as president, and
 he may continue to control it in a similar fashion at least for some time as prime
 minister. According to well-informed experts, he regards himself as an expert in
 foreign affairs, and has little use for advice of professionals from the Ministry of
 Foreign Affairs and academia.27 This is quite typical of the mindset of an ex-KGB
 officer, given the tendency of the members of that group to view themselves as the
 cr?me de la cr?me of the Soviet and post-Soviet bureaucracy.2 Despite his deserved
 image of being well briefed for international activities, and being genuinely more
 knowledgeable about the world beyond Russia's borders than any of his predeces
 sors in the Kremlin since Lenin, Putin regularly makes errors suggesting that he
 has not consulted real experts : for example, his belief that Dan Rather was fired
 from CBS on the orders of the Bush administration,29 that the White House could
 have prevented ABC from broadcasting an interview with the Chechen terrorist
 Shamil Basayev,30 that Zbigniew Brzezinski authored a plan for breaking up the
 Russian Federation, and that NATO is run from Washington just as the Warsaw
 Pact was run from Moscow:
 We know quite well how decisions are made in NATO. The same way it was done in
 the Warsaw Pact. They had a joke in East Germany: How does one know which of
 Honecker's phones was a direct line to Moscow? The one that can only receive calls ...
 In NATO everything is the same, only the phone is connected to Washington and not to
 Moscow.31
 2 See Vitaly Shlykov, 'Demonopolizatsiya informatsii', Rossiya v global'noy politike 6: 4, July?Aug. 2008, pp.
 160?62, 165?71.
 27 Trenin, 'Russia's foreign and security policy under Putin'.
 2 Laurent Murawiec and Clifford C. Gaddy, 'The higher police: Vladimir Putin and his predecessors', The
 National Interest 67, Spring 2002, pp. 29?36; Mikhail Tsypkin, 'Terrorism and the threat to new democracies',
 in Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, eds, Reforming intelligence: obstacles to democratic control and effectiveness
 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), p. 294.
 29 Richard Wolffe, 'Rating the roadshow', Newsweek, 7 March 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7037620/
 site/newsweek/, accessed 9 July 2007; see also 'News conference of presidents Bush and Putin', New York Times,
 24 Feb. 2005.
 30 Putin made the statement during a meeting with a group of western experts on Russia on 5 Sept. 2005 (author's
 notes).
 31 'Stenogramma besedy Vladimira Putina s zhurnalistami stran G8', Kommersant, http://www.kommersant.ru/
 articles/2007/putin.html?page=i, accessed 4 June 2007.
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 This statement accurately reflects the world-view, characteristic of many alumni
 of the Soviet/Russian intelligence agencies, that 'the "underside" of politics and
 economics is the only true story to tell. In other words, what is publicly available
 is usually a deceptive cover.'32 They also engage in mirror-imaging derived from
 their experience of Soviet and Russian policy-making, which has been charac
 terized by deception and intrigue. Therefore, the harder the Americans try to
 convince the Russians that they mean no harm, the more the Kremlin becomes
 suspicious of US intentions.
 US-Russian strategic miscommunication
 The US has made it easier for the Russians to arrive at a worst-case threat assess
 ment of missile defence. In 2001 the Bush administration unveiled its Nuclear
 Posture Review (NPR), which proclaimed the policy of 'mutual assured destruc
 tion' between Russia and the US to be dead. American policy-makers and experts
 assumed that the Russians understood and accepted that the new US strategic policy
 embodied in the NPR (partially declassified and partially leaked to the media) had
 ended the confrontational posture between the two nuclear superpowers. In fact,
 the NPR has probably contributed in a number of ways to the acrimony between
 the US and Russia and to damaging mutual understanding.
 A Russian military analyst sitting in on a press briefing on the NPR by Assis
 tant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch on 9 January 2002 would probably have
 concluded that nuclear weapons were going to be as important as ever in American
 strategy, and that Russia was not going to benefit from the NPR despite the
 document's professions of a 'new security relationship' between Russia and the US.
 According to the briefer, the US was going to keep the nuclear triad (consisting of
 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles,
 and strategic bomber aircraft), albeit at substantially lower quantitative levels.
 This smaller 'operationally deployed force' could be 'augmented' in response to
 'changes in the security environment'. It was smaller because of 'assumptions'
 about Russia's positive political evolution and plans to reduce its own nuclear
 forces. But the American force could be increased at any time because the warheads
 removed in the process of reductions would be preserved. The US nuclear forces
 would 'still require the capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types'.33 The
 Russians have probably interpreted all this as implicitly directed against Russia as
 well as other likely targets. The fact that the NPR was only partially declassified
 must have unshackled the imagination of GRU analysts, who could add their own
 projections to the information made available by the US. Moreover, they would
 not have missed the reference to future 'defensive systems with multiple layers'
 32 Trenin, 'Russia's foreign and security policy under Putin'.
 33 J. D. Crouch, 'Special briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review', US Department of Defense, Office
 of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 9 Jan. 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.
 aspx?transcriptid=no8, accessed 25 Jan. 2008. See also 'Nuclear Posture Review (excerpts)', submitted to
 Congress 31 Dec. 2001, http ://www. globalsecurity.org/wmd/library /policy /dod/npr.htm, accessed 25 Jan.
 2008. The latter source is not an official release; the author cannot confirm its authenticity.
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 in the leaked excerpts of the NPR. The emphasis on precision strikes combined
 with enhanced intelligence against mobile targets must have left the Russians
 wondering about the survivability of their mobile SS-25 and SS-27 interconti
 nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), while the requirement to increase hard-target
 kill capability would make them think about the survivability of their country's
 silo-based ICBMs and command and control facilities.
 After all the pronouncements on the 'new security relationship' with Russia,
 the drafters of the NPR made this caveat :
 Russia's nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many
 strategic problems around its periphery and its future course cannot be charted with
 certainty. U.S. planning must take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with
 Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force
 levels and posture.34
 Add to this the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (which gave the parties
 maximum freedom of action, something of more use to the US than to Russia
 with its weakened defence industry), and the American withdrawal from the ABM
 Treaty): by the time the US disclosed its plans to deploy missile interceptors in
 Central Europe (2004?2005), Russian military analysts had a rich nutrient medium
 for cultivating worst-case scenarios.
 There is also an important cultural factor that has become an obstacle to Russian
 American mutual understanding in the issue of missile defence. The Russians,
 who like most other Europeans experienced the massive devastation of twentieth
 century wars, do not understand the extreme sensitivity of the Americans to the
 vulnerability of the Homeland, invulnerable to external enemies for so long, to
 ballistic missiles. While Russia continues to operate a very limited BMD system
 around Moscow, there is no interest in building new missile defences. The
 American concern over the potential threat of Iranian nuclear-tipped missiles is
 heightened by an experience not shared by the Russians, that of the seizure of the
 American embassy in Tehran in 1979. Lacking understanding of the motivations of
 American politicians, the Russians are sceptical of explanations that the US BMD
 plans are driven by concerns about Iran, even though that country is unlikely to
 acquire more than a few ICBMs in the foreseeable future. The Americans, on their
 part, do not fully appreciate how much the Russian strategic culture is concerned
 with strategic depth, which saved Russia during Napoleon's invasion of 1812 and
 the German invasion of 1941. Therefore the Russian complaints about the NATO
 and US military facilities appearing not far from Russia's borders are dismissed in
 Washington as pure propaganda.
 The Russian elite's world view and missile defence
 The world view of the Russian elite has been fluctuating between recognition
 of post-Soviet realities and nostalgia for the Soviet era. Putin most famously
 expressed this attitude when he called the collapse of the Soviet Union the 'greatest
 34 Nuclear Posture Review.
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 geopolitical disaster' of the twentieth century. Furthermore, he proclaimed the
 Russian nation to be a victim of this event.35 This statement closed the histori
 cally short period of critical revision of the Soviet past by the Russian elites and
 began the process of relegitimizing the Soviet empire. This process has been
 neither all-embracing nor consistent: there have been no attempts to abolish
 private property or to close Russia off from the world around it. In the realm of
 foreign policy, Russia has chosen to eliminate or reduce the US influence along
 its periphery in the post-Soviet states, but has not embarked on a comprehensive
 political confrontation with the US in the style of the Cold War.
 The Russian elite's external threat perceptions are directly linked to their
 domestic concerns. Critics of Putin's regime (which continues to exist after
 Medvedev's accession in 2008) often suggest that the Russian elite has no real
 commitment to matters of state, and pursues only private gain under the guise of
 promoting the interests of the state. The elite's well-being, however, is linked to
 the strength and security of the Russian state, as they understand it. Their world
 view does not predispose them to complacency in this area. As one of the most
 perceptive Russian observers has put it, 'Russian strategic policymakers ... believe
 that all nations seek to expand their influence, and in order to do so they rely
 on their power, both hard and soft. In their view, military force is a usable tool
 of foreign policy.'3 The Russian elite's most important goal in this dog-eat-dog
 world is to maintain Russian sovereignty, and so to allow the elite to manage the
 country and its resources without interference from outside powers.37
 The image of being America's equal as a nuclear superpower is important, in
 the eyes of the Russian elite, for keeping geopolitical competitors at bay, especially
 since Russia cannot compete in conventional military power with the US and its
 NATO allies, or with China. Behind all the huffing and puffing by the Kremlin, the
 fact remains that Russia is vulnerable: its population is dwindling, it has no reliable
 and strong allies, it faces low-grade insurgency in the North Caucasus, its central
 authority has been rebuilt only recently and with great difficulty, its economy is
 excessively dependent on energy exports (as demonstrated most painfully by the
 current economic crisis), and it sits on top of a vast treasure of natural resources,
 while its North Atlantic and Asian-Pacific neighbours suffer from the shortage of
 these resources.
 Russia seeks a place in Europe and views the growing role of its former
 satellites and Soviet republics in European institutions, whether NATO or the
 EU, as a threat to its aspirations, because these nations are suspicious of Russia's
 intentions. (Russian conduct and great power rhetoric fuel such attitudes, but this
 escapes Moscow's attention.) American military installations in these countries
 35 Vladimir Putin, Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 25 April 2005, http ://www.kremlin.ru/
 appears/2005/o4/25/i223_type63372type?3374type82?34_87049.shtml, accessed 25 May 2009.
 3 Dmitri Trenin, 'Russia's threat perception and strategic posture', in Russian security strategy under Putin: U. S. and
 Russian perspectives, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Nov. 2007, http ://www. StrategicStud
 ieslnstitute.army.mil/, accessed 14 Dec. 2007, p. 35.
 37 Vladimir Putin defined sovereignty in a meeting with western experts on Russia in the following way : 'it's
 the ability to conduct one's foreign and domestic policies without external interference' ('Stenograficheskii
 otchyot o vstreche s uchastnikami tretyego zasedaniya Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba "Valdai"', 9
 Sept. 2006, http://kremlin.ru/text/appears/2006/09/111114.shtml, accessed 7 June 2008.
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 are inevitably seen as one more step towards excluding Russia from Europe. Even
 peaceful initiatives to bring these countries closer to Western Europe cause Russia
 concern: during the summit with the EU on 22 May 2009, Medvedev expressed
 suspicion that the EU's Eastern Partnership (involving a group of East European
 nations not yet in the EU or NATO) was directed against Moscow because the
 post-communist nations in the East were promoting anti-Russian policies.3
 Russian suspicions about American intentions have been exacerbated by
 their tendency to assume that Russia is the focus of hostile attention from US
 policy-makers and the American media and public. Russian politicians and media
 interpret almost every American pronouncement and policy as directed at Russia.
 During each electoral season in the US they argue with complete confidence that
 policy towards Russia is one of the most important issues debated by candidates
 for national office. Pronouncements of US defence and intelligence officials are
 scrutinized for signs of anti-Russian bias, and routine references to the unpre
 dictability of Russia's future are interpreted as affirmations of a US preoccupation
 with the Russian 'threat'. In part, this is the legacy of Soviet days: many Soviet
 officials considered the Watergate affair and subsequent resignation of President
 Richard Nixon to be an anti-Soviet plot.39 In part, it is often the result of mirror
 imaging: Russian elites and public are preoccupied with and hostile to the US.
 World opinion surveys consistently show the Russian public to be among those
 with the most negative views of the US. It is noteworthy that the election of
 Barack Obama has not changed such attitudes, and that negative views of the US
 are especially prevalent in the centre of Russian political, cultural and intellectual
 life?Moscow. Such attitudes apparently result from an assumption that the US
 is extremely hostile to Russia. In December 2007, 43 per cent of polled Russians
 agreed with the statement 'the purpose of America's foreign policy is the complete
 destruction of Russia'.40 It often seems that a desire to be America's equal, even in
 a highly negative relationship, drives Russians' perceptions: they would rather be
 noticed as enemies than ignored as friends. It is safe to assume that many members
 of Putin's elite, who are the alumni of military and security services, share such
 attitudes, since their mindset requires an enemy.41 The attitude of the Russian elite
 towards the US is also strongly influenced by a visceral desire for Vengeance' for
 the 'humiliation of the 1990s'.42
 3 'Press-konferentsiya po itogam sammita Rossiya?Yevrosoyuz', 22 May 2009, http://kremlin.ru/text/
 appears/2009/05/216699.shtml, accessed 22 May 2009.
 39 Jack F. Matlock, Jr, Reagan and Gorbachev (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 28; Victor Israelyan, Inside the
 Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1995), p. 94.
 40 Views of the United States April 2007 (Chicago: Council of World Affairs/WorldOpinion.org, http://
 www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_T0pline%20Reports/POS%202007_Global%20Issues/
 WPO_07%20oreport.pdf, accessed 8 June 2009./2007); 'Otnosheniye rossyan k SShA, YeS, Ukraine, Gruzii i
 Belarusi' (Levada Center, March 2009), http://www.levada.ru/press/2009040102.html, accessed 22 May, 2009;
 'Kak vliyayet mesto zhitel'stva na vzglyady i obraz zhizni rossiyan?' (Levada Center, Sept. 2008), http://www.
 polit.ru/research/2008/09/09/faktormesta_print.html, accessed 16 Sept. 2008; 'Some Russians fear US foreign
 policy targets them', Angus Reid Global Monitor, 25 Dec. 2007, in fohnson's Russia List, no. 263, 26 Dec. 2007.
 41 This point has been developed in some detail by the pre-eminent scholar of the Russian elite, Dr Olga
 Kryshtanovskaya, in her recent public lecture: 'Rossiyskaya elita na perekhode', 29 May 2008, http://www.
 polit.ru/lectures/2008/07/31/rus_elita.html, accessed 3 Aug. 2008.
 42 Graham, U.S?Russia relations, p. 8.
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 The style and substance of Russian foreign policy since 2000 have exacerbated
 the Kremlin's resistance to the American missile defence. A simple survey of the
 website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs points to a pattern: grand
 plans to benefit humankind are mixed with angry proclamations and threats over
 causes both important and petty. It looks as if the Kremlin is seeking pretexts for
 brawling, especially with the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact members.
 Pretexts range from the dismantling of a monument to a Soviet soldier in Estonia
 to a dispute over gas deliveries to Ukraine, and from the change of a street name
 (from that of a Russian writer to a Ukrainian one) in Ukraine to the request to
 declassify documents relating to the execution in 1940 of Polish prisoners of war
 on Stalin's orders. The Russian parliament is currently debating a law that would
 make it a crime for citizens of former Soviet republics (now independent nations)
 to 'distort' the history of the Second World War and 'rehabilitate Nazism'. In
 contemporary Russian political discourse, nationalist forces in Ukraine and the
 Baltic states are rehabilitating Nazism by rejecting the Soviet victory in the Second
 World War as the liberating event in their histories. The Russians' tendency to
 thumb their noses at anyone who displeases Moscow applies to major powers
 too, as demonstrated by the election of Andrei Lugovoy, accused of murdering
 Alexander Litvinenko in Britain, to the Russian parliament in 2007. These actions
 have yielded no positive results for Russian foreign policy. Indeed, they have
 aggravated tensions in Russia's relations with many countries, and have limited
 the flexibility of Russian diplomacy. The prime example of such counterpro
 ductive actions was Russia's decision in 2008 to recognize the independence of
 Abkhazia and Ossetia, which locked it into an inflexible position that will compli
 cate its national security policy for decades to come. Still, all of these actions have
 been popular at home and strengthened the position of the ruling elite. Given this
 atmosphere of grievance, any proposal to locate missile defence sites in former
 Warsaw Pact satellites of the Soviet Union has been bound to provoke outrage
 in Moscow, because it has reminded the Russian elite of the demise of the Soviet
 superpower and of what they perceive as the broken promise not to expand
 NATO into Eastern Europe.
 The alacrity with which Moscow responds even to minor challenges from small
 neighbours seems designed to demonstrate that Russia has indeed 'risen from its
 knees' (to use a popular phrase from the Russian current political lexicon), and
 reflects the combative character of Vladimir Putin. This atmosphere of grandiose
 claims mixed with angry scenes, reminiscent of Dostoevsky's novels, is hardly
 conducive to methodical implementation of great power strategies. For instance,
 the main countermeasure to missile defence threatened by the Kremlin?to deploy
 Iskander operational tactical missiles in the Kaliningrad province in order to target
 the proposed interceptor site in Poland?makes no military sense. According to
 the former director of the main think-tank of Russian strategic nuclear forces,
 General Vladimir Dvorkin (ret.), there are no realistic scenarios for the use of these
 missiles. Once the interceptors were launched it would be too late to use them;
 therefore they could be used only pre-emptively, which would mean a war against
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 nuclear-armed NATO. They could be used in retaliation?but only if NATO
 were to begin a war against a nuclear-armed Russia. Neither scenario is plausible,
 argues Dvorkin.43 Iskander missiles seem to have become simply the magic bullet
 of public diplomacy for the Kremlin, which recently threatened again to deploy
 them in Kaliningrad, this time in the event of American surface-to-air Patriot
 missiles being deployed in Poland.44 The more frequent the threats of this kind,
 the less impact they are likely to have on the imagination of Europeans.
 Sovereignty and strategic instability
 From the Russian standpoint, strategic instability favouring the US may open
 Russia to political pressure and to a partial loss of the elite's cherished sovereignty.
 The Russians realize that deployment of a truly capable US BMD system is a
 matter of a relatively distant future: under the most favourable circumstances, the
 US would not be able to deploy ten interceptors in Poland before 2013,45 Foreign
 Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the ten interceptors would present no threat
 to Russia, but that the Kremlin was concerned about the probability of a future
 global US BMD system with 'hundreds or even thousands' of interceptors not
 limited by any guarantee on the part of the US.4 Such a possibility, from the
 Russian standpoint, would open up the prospect of vulnerability to nuclear black
 mail. According to this logic, the US would be able to threaten Russia with a first
 strike against its land-based ICBMs, confident that its missile defence would be
 able to intercept whatever remained of the Russian retaliatory forces.47 The threat
 could be implicit, since the strategic equation would be well understood by both
 sides, but it would paralyse the will of the weaker party (Russia) in any confron
 tation, and this knowledge by itself would supposedly encourage the US to put
 pressure on Russia for concessions that might threaten the power of the elite.
 Russia's weakness in the 1990s made it vulnerable to external pressure on issues
 relating to its domestic politics and economy. This memory, still fresh, makes the
 Russian elite particularly susceptible to any scenario (however far-fetched) under
 which Russia?and the elite's sovereign power to control it?may come under
 such pressure again. But even long before any such vulnerability arose, American
 missile defence facilities deployed in the former Soviet satellites against Russia's
 objections would serve as a reminder of Moscow's weakness (as well as of its
 lack of technological capabilities to match American missile defences) in its own
 neighbourhood.
 43 Vladimir Dvorkin, 'Bronya krepka ... k ney by yeshche logiku', Yezhednevnyy zhurnal, 12 Nov. 2008, http://
 ej.ru/?a=note&id=85?4, accessed 12 Nov. 2008.
 44 'Russia could deploy missiles near Poland', Radio Liberty /Radio Free Europe, 21 May 2009, http://www.
 rferl.org/content/Russia_Could_Deploy_Missiles_Near_Poland/1736698.html, accessed 21 May 2009.
 45 'Tezisy vystupleniya nachal'nika General'nogo shtaba Vooruzhennikh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii na press
 konferentsii 15 dekabrya 2007', http ://www.mil.ru/info/io69/details/index.shtml?id=3 5200, accessed 15 Aug.
 2008.
 4 'Inter'vyu ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S. V. Lavrova, opublikovannoye v "Gazete Vyborchei" (Varshava)
 7 fevralya 2008 goda', http://www.mid.rU/brp_4.nsf/0/F7882ED08D806CD4C32573E90040BC50, accessed 8
 Feb. 2008.
 47 See interview with Gen. Yuriy Baluyevskiy, Armeyskiy sbornik, no. 9, 2007, p. 6.
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 Russia's relations with a number of former Soviet republics along its periphery
 are fraught with possible conflicts. The pretexts might vary (among them is the
 safety of ethnic Russian minorities, or minorities that have Russian citizenship, as
 in the case of the war against Georgia in August 2008), but the underlying reason
 is the preoccupation of the Russian strategic culture with strategic depth. If the
 US substantially degrades Russia's retaliatory potential, Russia believes it would
 lose its freedom of action in its own neighbourhood. The war with Georgia in
 2008 clearly demonstrated how important a robust nuclear force is for Russia:
 very soon after the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Georgia, a US
 ally, Washington made it very clear that it would not be militarily involved in
 the conflict. Given the ease with which the US has dispatched its military against
 non-nuclear nations in the last decade, the Russians must have concluded that it is
 their ability to strike back at the US with nuclear weapons that has left them with
 a free hand in their 'back yard' in the face of Washington's outrage. An American
 global missile defence system that, as the Russians fear, might grow out of the
 currently planned limited deployments could take that freedom of action away
 from Russia. The option that existed for the USSR in the 1960s and 1970s?to
 overwhelm any proposed US missile defence by deploying more and more nuclear
 delivery vehicles?is no longer available to Russia because of the decline of its
 military?industrial complex.
 Were Moscow as weak as it was in the 1990s, it would probably acquiesce in the
 American missile defence plans. But Russia, while remaining vulnerable in many
 ways, has gained a certain amount of self-confidence?and not only thanks to the
 flow of petrodollars. From the time of Gorbachev's reforms up to the beginning
 of the Putin era, Soviet and then Russian elites suffered from a profound loss of
 self-confidence. Whatever they tried did not work, while the Americans seemed
 to have the key to success: the US economy was thriving, the US was winning
 cold and hot wars and accumulating budget surpluses, while the Soviet Union and
 its Russian successor had no 'soft power' influence and were accumulating debts.
 This era could be summed up in the words of the then prime minister Viktor
 Chernomyrdin: 'We wanted to do it better, but it has turned out the usual way.'
 In a few years, the situation has changed drastically. The US has lost much of the
 psychological advantage it enjoyed at the end of the Cold War, and, the Russians
 believe, is on the verge of losing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Putin's personal
 self-confidence in foreign policy must have received a boost from the fact that he
 warned George Bush in 2002 that the real danger of terrorism came not from Iraq
 but from Pakistan.4 This is quite a turnaround from the days when the US was
 mentoring Russia. The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan also suggests to the
 Russians that their failure in that country had not been the proof of their unique
 incompetence.49 Moreover, since the early 1990s the Russians have insisted that
 48 'Bush, Putin extol productive U.S.?Russian relationship', Washington File, 22 Nov. 2002, http://usinfo.state.
 gov/cgi-bin/washiile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=02ii2203.wlt&t=/products/washfile/news
 item.shtml, accessed 23 Nov. 2003.
 49 For a sceptical Russian view of NATO's prospects in Afghanistan in view of the Soviet experience there,
 see Oleg Kulakov, Lessons learned from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: implications for Russian defense reform,
 Research Paper 26, March 2006, Research Branch, NATO Defense College, Rome, p. 7.
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 the post-Cold War world would be characterized by ethnic and religious conflict
 and an all-out competition for natural resources?and not by a wave of democratic
 change led by that unipolar power, the United States. They are congratulating
 themselves now that they were right, while the Americans were wrong.
 The defeat of Georgia by Russia in the face of America's inability to protect
 its friend has done nothing to reduce the Kremlin's growing self-confidence. The
 initial stages of the current economic crisis were greeted in Moscow as a sign of
 America's impending undoing. In summer of 2008 an anonymous senior official
 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the United States was facing 'a full
 scale existential crisis' and should learn 'to live within its means'.50 At the time of
 writing, the economic crisis has had a somewhat sobering effect on the Russian
 elites. The prospects for defence spending are dim, unemployment is on the rise,
 and there is talk about the need for western credits. The West, however, suffers
 together with Russia, and the general 'we won't be pushed around any more' tone
 of Russian foreign policy has not changed.
 Thus, Russian politics and policy-making are characterized by a combination
 of overly pessimistic threat assessment, insufficient reliance on experts, predispo
 sition to see the US as an enemy, and hubris. This mixture of factors makes the
 Russians both hostile to missile defence in Central Europe and hopeful that they
 can bring about a political defeat of American plans.
 Is agreement possible?
 Do the Russians really want, as they claim, to participate in a joint missile defence
 project with the US? The issue of American missile defence is deeply entangled in
 Russian politics, and this is likely to limit the freedom of manoeuvre of the Putin?
 Medvedev duumvirate. Putin proposed a solution to the missile defence problem
 during the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, on 7 June 2007, and devel
 oped it further during the summit at Kennebunkport in the US on 2 July 2007.
 He suggested joint use of the Gabala early warning radar leased by Russia from
 Azerbaijan, and activation of the Joint Data Exchange Centre (JDEC) in Moscow
 (agreed upon by presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in 1999, but still not operational),
 as well as their upgrading to work in real time. He also raised the possibility of
 broadening the system by including the new early warning system (EWS) radar in
 southern Russia. All of this, he emphasized, could happen only if the American
 plans in Poland and the Czech Republic were not implemented.51 Medvedev
 continues to insist that the proposal is still on the table. The new National Security
 Strategy of the Russian Federation, signed by Medvedev on 2 May 2009, has
 reaffirmed Russia's opposition to a 'global system of missile defence developed
 5? Fedor Lukyanov, 'Istochnik shumovykh effektov', Gazeta.ru, 31 July 2008, http://www.gazeta.ru/column/
 lukyanov/2797507.shtml, accessed 5 Aug. 2008.
 51 'Zayavleniya dlya pressy i otvety na voprosy po zavershenii vstrechi s Prezidentom SShA Dzhordzhem
 Bushem', 7june 2007, http://kremlin.ru/text/appears/2007/06/133152.shtml, accessed 13 Aug. 2007; 'Sovmest
 naya press-konferentsiya s Prezidentom SShA Dzhordzhem Bushem', 2 July 2007, http://kremlin.ru/text/
 appears/2007/07/136681.shtml, accessed 13 Aug. 2007.
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 in a unilateral fashion'.52 The official document, however, says nothing about the
 proposed limited deployment in Central Europe. Are the Russians looking for an
 agreement that would give them a role in managing a joint missile defence system?
 A number of independent Russian experts have promoted plans for joint US
 Russian missile defence. These plans borrow some elements from Putin's proposal
 (use of the Gabala and Armavir early warning radars, and activation of the JDEC,
 with a new capability to work in real time), but preserve the guidance radar in
 the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland or somewhere else in Europe. The
 key to the operation of such a system would be a joint threat assessment: once
 consensus regarding the threat is reached, the missile defence system would be
 directed against the target missile trajectories and react automatically (because
 there is no time for human consultations) to a launch from any target nation(s).53
 While the technical feasibility of such a project has not yet been established, the
 likely political obstacles are quite obvious and very considerable. Reaching agree
 ment on threat assessment and use of missile defence would be very difficult. For
 instance, the Russians would be wary of America' s anti-Iranian stance, while the
 US would be concerned about the possibility of a Russian veto on the employment
 of the missile defence system. Operating a joint missile defence system would raise
 the spectre of leaks of classified information to third parties. Recent experience
 suggests that Russian?American joint efforts in strategic affairs even on a much
 more modest level than missile defence have not been successful. The Russian
 American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) system project was terminated by
 the US in 2004 after a fruitless effort over five years. The JDEC, agreed upon by
 the two nations in 2000, has made no progress up to now. Both programmes fell
 victim to politics, problems of sharing sensitive technological data, and a lack of
 motivation.54
 Implementing a joint system would require compromises on both sides. Russia,
 for instance, would most probably have to drop its opposition to the US decision
 to deploy missile interceptors in Central Europe. But the domestic political factors
 that influenced Putin's decision to fight against American missile defence are still
 there, even with the presidential succession over: the insecurities and political
 theatre surrounding Russia's nuclear weapons, the need to conduct new 'special
 operations' to keep the political system on course, the already routine and visceral
 anti-Americanism of the political discourse, the suspicion that Russia is being
 forced out of Europe, and so on. Russia's military posture continues to rely on
 nuclear weapons to compensate for the weakness of its conventional forces.55 This
 makes the Russian establishment very suspicious about American missile defence,
 52 'Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda', http://kremlin.ru/text/
 docs/2009/05/216229.shtml, accessed 18 May 2009.
 53 See e.g. Pavel Zolotarev, 'Protivoraketnaya oborona: istoriya i perspektivy', Rossiya vglobal'noy politike 6: 3,
 May?June 2008, pp. 136?42.
 54 See Victoria Samson, 'Prospects for Russian?American missile defence cooperation: lessons from RAMOS
 andJDEC, Contemporary Security Policy 28: 3, Dec. 2007, pp. 494-512.
 55 On 9 February 2009 the Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov, said that 'nuclear weapons will
 continue to be the main stabilizing factor, and their role may become even more important' : cited in Viktor
 Yesin, 'Novyy dogovor o SNV: bazovye printsipy dokumenta', Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 27 Feb. 2009.
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 especially since the Russian defence industry finds it difficult even to maintain
 the current level of strategic forces. Any agreement approving American missile
 defence in Europe, however favourable to Russia, would be likely to trigger a
 discussion among the Russian elites of the state of Russian strategic forces : an
 unwelcome development for the Kremlin, given its many problems in maintaining
 and developing these forces, as well as the ignorance of many elite members when
 it comes to arms control and strategic weapons and their tendency to demagoguery
 on the subject. After two years of drumbeating about the threat these intercep
 tors would present to Russia's strategic deterrent, the duumvirate in the Kremlin
 (a clumsy political arrangement) may find it difficult to execute a volte-face and
 suddenly proclaim that the interceptors are no longer a threat.
 Russia's domestic political situation has yet to achieve a degree of stability and
 continuity sufficient to provide the basis for a consistent, predictable and rational
 national security policy. The underground tremors produced by power struggles
 in and around the Kremlin, the gap between Russia's great power aspirations and
 its real capabilities, suspicion and hostility to the US elevated to the rank of all
 but an official ideology, the struggles with the US over what Russia perceives
 as the area of its influence in the post-Soviet republics and the lack of a well
 informed debate on strategic issues: all these factors are likely to make arriving
 at an agreement about missile defence in Europe very difficult. It may take some
 time for Russia's political system to mature to the point where its national security
 policy no longer has to depend so much upon the fluctuations and passions of
 domestic politics, and its policy-makers make full use of the talent and expertise
 that Russian society can produce.
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